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GOVERNMENT IN PROMOTING AND PROTECTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
IN SOUTH AFRICA: WHAT ABOUT SEPARATION OF POWERS? 
 
          DM Davis  
 
The model of constitutional democracy which is envisaged in the 1996 text of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (the Constitution) has been described as 
promoting  'a thick' conception of democracy.  It is concerned with the empowerment 
of all citizens to participate in decisions that are crucial to the outcome of their life 
choices. At its most basic promise, the Constitution promotes a model of 
participatory democracy, by creating a series of representative institutions and 
enabling participation in decision making, both inside and outside of these 
institutions. Expressed differently, the Constitution promotes both participation 
through regular elections and enshrines a principle of accountability in terms of 
which government can be held accountable for particular aspects of its policy, 
particularly those which fail to pass constitutional muster.  That leads to the second 
component of the model which introduces a substantive set of guarantees to ensure 
participation. The idea is that various institutions of State should work to promote 
and to vindicate basis democratic principles which are directed to accountable 
control of decision making and substantive political equality between citizens.1 
 
To a considerable extent, the constitutional text encapsulates this vision in a number 
of provisions. In particular, section 7(2) of the Constitution creates an obligation on 
the State to 'respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights'. As 
was noted by the Constitutional Court in Glenister v President of the Republic of 
South Africa:2 
 
                                                          
  Mr Justice Denis Davis. LLB, LLD (Hon), M. Phil (University of Cambridge). Judge of the High 
Court, Cape Town and Judge President of the Competition Appeal Court. Email: 
dennis.davis@uct.ac.za. Keynote speech delivered on 16 November 2012 at the Konrad-
Adenauer Foundation and Faculty of Law (NWU, Potchefstroom Campus) 3rd Human Rights 
Indaba on The Role of International Law in Understanding and Applying the Socio-economic 
Rights in South Africa's Bill of Rights. 
1  See in particular Brand "Judicial Deference and Democracy". 
2  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 7 BCLR 651 (CC) para 105. 
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This provision extends beyond a mere negative obligation not to act in a manner 
that will infringe or restrict a right. Rather it entails positive duties on the State to 
take deliberate reasonable measures to give effect to all the fundamental rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights. 
 
In their majority judgment in Glenister, Moseneke DCJ and Cameron J noted that 
implicit in section 7(2):   
 
is the requirement that the steps the State takes to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the constitutional obligations must be reasonable and effective.  
 
The two justices continue:3 
 
Now plainly there are many ways in which the state can fulfil its duty to take positive 
measures to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.  This 
Court will not be prescriptive as to what measures the state takes as long as they 
fall within the range of possible conduct that a reasonable decision maker in the 
circumstances may adopt. 
 
In this case, the Court considered that the State was required to take account of its 
international obligations in order to curb corruption in society and hence to ensure 
the creation of an independent entity which would combat corruption.4 
 
The principles developed in Glenister followed, to a considerable extent, the 
approach which had previously been adopted by the Constitutional Court with regard 
to the enforcement of social and economic rights. In Mazibuko v City of 
Johannesburg, O'Regan J said: 5 
 
Ordinarily it is institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine precisely what the 
achievement of any particular social and economic right entails and what steps 
government should take to ensure the progressive realisation of the right.  This is a 
matter in the first place for the legislature and executive … indeed it is desirable as 
a matter of democratic accountability that they should do so for it is their programs 
and promises that are subjected to democratic popular choice.  
 
I have cited these important dicta from the Constitutional Court to emphasise that, in 
seeking to remain true to the twin principles that I have outlined, our Constitution 
envisages a dialogical conception of constitutional democracy. The three spheres of 
                                                          
3  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 7 BCLR 651 (CC) para 191. 
4  See Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 7 BCLR 651 (CC) para 200. 
5  Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 61. 
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government are constituted as distinctive entities, but they are also interdependent 
and interrelated, as is evident from the dicta cited above. As Liebenberg notes in her 
important text:6 
 
What is important however is that the branches of government remain engaged with 
each other in a manner which is open and respectful of the institutional strength and 
weaknesses of each other. Through this process the limits of each branch's 
institutional power will be continually defined and redefined as they respond to the 
multifarious challenges of South Africa's evolving constitutional democracy. 
 
Conceptually, this model , which views the promotion and protection of human rights 
in the country as a product of a partnership, albeit somewhat adversarial, between 
the courts and the other arms of government, is sourced in a particular theory of 
constitutional politics which is both nuanced and sometimes contradictory.  For the 
purposes of this speech, I can do no better than seek to capture these features of 
this model by citing Christodoulidis:7 
 
Political power must present itself as conditioned - as giving expression to the 
constitutional order. The highest power in the community is thus sovereign only on 
condition that it is not; because on condition that its actions are valid, because 
imputed to the constitution that establishes the conditions by which the popular will 
can be expressed as sovereign. Law and democracy are reconciled only via the 
suppression of a paradox.  Need we repeat, then, against all those who proclaim 
the return of the political in law, that constitutional politics is compromised politics, 
to the same measure that legal discourse is a compromised instance of practical 
discourse. 
 
The tension between democracy and constitutional law plays out in uneven ways.  
Let me illustrate the most obvious problem: compliance with orders of courts. I 
accept that in numerous cases over the two decades of democracy the legislative 
arm of government has fashioned policy in terms of parameters fashioned by the 
courts. Similarly, specific policy which has been developed by the executive has 
taken account of the human rights jurisprudence developed by the courts over the 
past 18 years.   
 
But there are signs of an increased and thus disturbing tension. Obviously, the most 
prominent of these cases relates to the difficulty which the Democratic Alliance has 
                                                          
6  Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 70. 
7  Christodoulidis 2002 TSAR 123-124. 
DM DAVIS                                                                                             PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
5 / 638 
 
encountered in ensuring compliance with an order of the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Democratic Alliance v Acting NDPP.8  In this case the court ordered that the Acting 
NDPP produce and lodge with the registrar of the court the record of the decision of 
6 April 2009 to discontinue the prosecution of Mr Zuma. That order provided that the 
record should exclude the written representations made on behalf of the third 
respondent (Mr Zuma) and any consequent memorandum or report prepared in 
response thereto or oral representations if the production thereof will breach any 
confidentiality attached to the representations ('the reduced record'). It is about this 
reduced record that there is now considerable controversy, in that compliance 
remains no more than an expectation. 
 
There have also been numerous other decisions, particularly involving the 
Department of Home Affairs which have proved to be equally problematic. In 
Somalia Association of SA v Minister of Home Affairs,9 which dealt with a decision to 
close a refugee office in Port Elizabeth, Mr Justice Pickering noted that: 
 
It is disquieting that the second respondent (DG of Home Affairs) did not see fit to 
consult with the standing committee before taking the decision to close the 
reception office (which was in Port Elizabeth and was used by refugees).  
  
Mr Justice Pickering went on to observe:10 
 
Second respondent was required to consult with the standing committee should he 
be contemplating the closure of one of the reception offices with all of the negative 
and prejudicial consequences to vulnerable asylum seekers which would ensue 
therefrom.  
 
My understanding is that the Department petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeal 
unsuccessfully but has continued to act regardless of this result. There had been a 
number of cases in which the same conduct has manifested itself and which has 
further required litigation without any apparent attempt by the Department to reflect 
upon the implications of whether its conduct complies with the highest standards of 
human rights. For example in Abdi v Minister of Home Affairs,11 two people, who had 
                                                          
8  Democratic Alliance v Acting NDPP 2012 6 BCLR 613 (SCA). 
9  Somalia Association of SA v Minister of Home Affairs 2012 5 SA 634 (ECP). 
10  Somalia Association of SA v Minister of Home Affairs 2012 5 SA 634 (ECP) para 640. 
11  Abdi v Minister of Home Affairs 2011 3 All SA 117 (SCA). 
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been deported from Namibia to Somalia through OR Tambo International Airport, 
were held in an inadmissible facility at that airport. The Minister of Home Affairs 
contended that, while the applicants were in this facility they were not legally in 
South Africa and hence South African authorities and courts held no jurisdiction over 
them. This argument was firmly rejected by the Supreme Court of Appeal.  
Bertelsmann AJA held:12 
 
The argument that a South African court has no jurisdiction over the inadmissible 
facility by virtue of the fiction that it does not form part of the Republic's territory is 
wrong.  
 
A legal mistake by the Department is understandable, namely, that it is possible to 
be given incorrect advice which is then corrected by the courts. What is much more 
problematic is the following observation by Bertelsmann AJA, on behalf of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal:13 
 
It is a matter of a comment that the respondents were parties to that matter 
(Lawyers for Human Rights case) and the Constitutional Court rejected a similar 
argument that was advanced in the court below and before us. 
 
There are numerous similar examples that should trigger a concern.14    
 
As I hope I have made clear, the relationship between courts and other arms of 
government should be in a process of creative tension. But the emphasis should be 
on the creative. In other words, the object of the exercise is to ensure that all policy 
complies with the framework of our Constitution in general and the human rights 
guarantees in Chapter 2 in particular.  
 
This background is not irrelevant to the specific topic of my paper. As Rosenberg15 
observes, courts are more likely to produce significant social reform when other 
actors offer positive incentives to induce compliance and where those crucial to the 
implementation of court orders are willing to so act in co-operation.    
                                                          
12  Abdi v Minister of Home Affairs 2011 3 All SA 117 (SCA) para 28. 
13  Abdi v Minister of Home Affairs 2011 3 All SA 117 (SCA) para 21. 
14  See for example Eisenberg v Director General of Home Affairs (Case No 10043/2011, Western 
Cape High Court, 27 Nov 2012). 
15  Rosenberg Hollow Hope. 
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With this observation, I turn to deal with the relationship between courts and the 
other arms of state within the specific area of provisioning and enforcement of socio 
and economic rights. Here the problem of creative tension is inherent in the 
distributional consequences of decisions which both lay down the scope of and 
enforce a socio economic constitutional provision. From the commencement of the 
court's engagement with socio and economic rights, there was a concern about the 
definition of the role and scope of courts in the development and enforcement of 
social and economic rights. 
 
Thus, in the second socio-economic rights case heard by the Constitutional Court in 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom,16 the Court tended to 
regard its role in the enforcement of socio economic rights as a secondary to the 
political process. To be sure, it utilised the administrative law concept of 
reasonableness to assess measures which a government agency had taken to give 
effect to the socio economic rights enshrined in the Constitution. Further, it 
buttressed the concept of reasonableness with a substantive principle, namely that 
those who are most desperately poor and in a situation of particular crisis should be 
attended to immediately by the relevant State agency; in the context of Grootboom, it 
meant that the government was required to provide the litigants who were very poor 
people with temporary shelter, pending the provision of permanent housing which, at 
a later date would fully ensure the vindication of their right of access to adequate 
housing as contained in section 26 of the Constitution.   
 
That principle has however been deployed with greater caution in subsequent cases.  
Accordingly, in Mazibuko the court set out a very clear definition of its role:17 
 
When challenged as to its policies relating to socio and economic rights, the 
government agency must explain why the policy is reasonable. Government must 
disclose what it has done to formulate the policy: Its investigation and research, the 
alternatives considered, and the reasons why the options underlying the policy was 
selected. The Constitution does not require government to be held to an impossible 
standard of perfection. Nor does it require courts to take over the tasks that in a 
democracy should properly be reserved for the democratic arms of the government.  
Simply put, through the institution of the courts, government can be called upon to 
                                                          
16  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 1 SA 46 (CC). 
17  Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 160-161. 
 
DM DAVIS                                                                                             PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
8 / 638 
 
account as citizens for its decision. This understanding of socio and economic rights 
litigation accords with the founding values of our Constitution and, in particular, the 
principles that government should be responsive, accountable and open. 
 
Much criticism has been lodged against this approach, particularly for the failure of 
the Court to define and evaluate the interests at stake in the case; in other words, 
the evaluation of the interests of many households with insufficient water to meet 
their basic needs and who considered that the provision of  their basic needs, as 
enshrined in the Constitution, had been frustrated by the policy of the City,  as 
weighed up against the claim of the City that it had more pressing policy priorities, 
particularly the provision of basic water supply to informal settlements. For this 
reason, it has been argued that the Court in Mazibuko did not apply the Grootboom 
standard of substantive reasonableness satisfactorily so as to test the City's policy 
against a meaningful and concrete standard of review. In other words, critics of the 
Court have suggested that the Court should enquire as to whether the failure of the 
state agency, alternatively its refusal to address a particular state of affairs which 
flowed from a particular policy or interpretation thereof is reasonable in the 
circumstances. In this way, the Court would step into the shoes of the poor 
community faced with the particular problem which has given rise to the litigation, 
thereby placing the social and economic context of the litigants at the forefront of its 
analysis.18    
 
To these criticisms, the response has been that courts have limited scope in this 
area, particularly because of the restraining influence of the doctrine of separation of 
powers. It is a point which has been made consistently by prominent political leaders 
over the last couple of years. To take but one example; President Zuma told 
Parliament on 15 March 2012 the following in answer to a question with regard to the 
role of courts: 
 
The three arms of government have very clear distinct functions. Those must be 
respected. The function of this Parliament is to legislate and conduct 
oversight… that is its job. Whilst it is the arm that makes the laws, it does not 
interpret the laws. That is the duty of the judiciary that must check whether this 
arm has taken all the necessary constitutional understanding in making the law 
to ensure that it is not infringing on the Constitution. Is the law constitution? 
                                                          
18  See in particular Williams 2010 CCR 141. 
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That is the job of the judiciary.  The executive must run the country; that is the 
job of the judiciary. The executive must run the country; that is its duty. In the 
process of all of this, these different arms respect one another. They work 
together, they must coordinate this, because they belong to one and the same 
state. 
 
In turn, this line of argument has been used to suggest that the judiciary, because it 
does not 'run the country', should not intrude into core areas of social and economic 
policy. This observation is then invoked as a justification for an approach of extreme 
deference when deciding upon all aspects of government policy. From this vantage 
point, deference becomes the corollary to separation of powers 
 
Fortunately, the Constitutional Court has examined the doctrine of separation of 
powers over some time, thereby providing far more subtle guidance to this potential 
problem. In particular, the Court has considered the argument that the doctrine of 
separation of powers will be undermined, if executive decisions are all too easily set 
aside and the judiciary then crosses a boundary into the executive's sphere. In 
Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of RSA,19 the Constitutional Court 
emphasised the importance of the doctrine of separation of powers in ensuring that 
courts are able to discharge their constitutional duty with regard to ensuing the 
legitimate exercise of public power. It cited an earlier decision in South African 
Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath:20 
 
The separation required by the Constitution between the legislature and executive 
on the one hand and the courts on the other, must be upheld, otherwise the role of 
the courts as an independent arbiter of issue involving the division of powers 
between the various spheres of government, and legality of legislative and 
executive action measures against the Bill of Rights and other provisions of the 
Constitution will be undermined. 
 
The court has consistently noted that the doctrine of separation of powers does not 
mean that a court is impotent when faced with a constitutional challenge to a 
decision of the executive or legislation from the legislature. Most recently in 
Democratic Alliance v The President of the Republic of South Africa, Yacoob ADCJ 
                                                          
19  Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 10 BCLR 1017 
(CC). 
20  South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 1 SA 803 (CC) para 26. 
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confirmed the rule that executive decisions may be set aside only if they are 
irrational. He said that the rule that:21 
 
they are not ordinarily to be set aside because they are merely unreasonable or 
procedurally unfair has been adopted precisely to ensure that the principle of 
separation of powers is respected and given full effect.  
 
He then went on to explain:22 
 
It is therefore difficult to conceive how the separation of powers can be said to be 
undermined by the rationality enquiry. The only possible connection might be that 
rationality has a different meaning and content if separation of powers is involved 
then otherwise. In other words, the question whether the means adopted are 
rationally related to the ends and executive decision-making cases somehow 
involves a lower threshold than in relation to precisely the same decision involving 
the same process in the administrative context. This is wrong. Rationality does not 
conceive of differing thresholds. It cannot be suggested that the decision that would 
be irrational in an administrative law setting might mutate into a rational decision if 
the decision being evaluated was an executive one. The separation of powers has 
nothing to do with whether a decision is rational. In these circumstances the 
principle of separation of powers is not of particular importance in this case. Either 
the decision is rational or it is not. 
 
What becomes important in assessing the task of courts when faced with the 
invocation of the doctrine of separation of powers appears to be less an emphasis 
about the doctrine and more about how a court works within the confines of the 
doctrine to promote a better dialogue between the legislature, executive and the 
courts. In turn the task should be directed to improve the principle of democratic 
accountability of public institutions and their commitment to constitutional rights. 
 
This particular submission is luminously highlighted in the instructive article of 
Williams referred to earlier, in which she compares the approach of the German and 
South African Constitutional Courts, the latter in Mazibuko and the former in a case 
known as Hartz IV. This case concerned a review of social legislation which was 
introduced in Germany. The court was required to evaluate social legislation which 
introduced new social benefits. In its judgment the German Constitutional Court, 
engaged in a detailed examination of the evidence regarding the legislature's 
                                                          
21  Democratic Alliance v President of South Africa CCT 122/11, [2012] ZACC 24, 5 Oct 2012 para 
41. 
22  Democratic Alliance v President of South Africa CCT 122/11, [2012] ZACC 24, 5 Oct 2012 para 
44. Own emphasis. 
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methodology in determining various social benefits, reviewed the calculations thereof 
and assessed whether both the initial calculations and subsequent changes were 
empirically justified and therefore plausible. Without an express constitutional 
provision of socio and economic rights in the governing constitutional  text, the court 
worked with the fundamental right to human dignity in Article 1(1) of the German 
Constitution and found that the mandate of the court was to test whether a 
transparent calculation of a minimum level of subsistence had been provided with 
the new benefits and whether these new benefits could be justified in terms of the 
constitutional principle of dignity as the Court articulated it. 
 
A comparison of the decisions in Mazibuko and Hartz IV reveals that, in both cases, 
courts were faced with the invocation of the doctrine of separation of powers. But the 
doctrine is not unambiguous and does not come to the courts in a neatly creased 
and folded manner. In both cases, it could be argued that the court adopted some 
principle of deference or, alternatively, respect for the institutional competence of the 
other two arms of state. But even where there is recognition of the primacy of the 
legislature in making a particular determination, very different judicial approaches 
can be formulated to test whether the legislature has passed legislation or the 
executive implemented policy which is constitutionally compliant. In other words, the 
concept of reasonableness, which initially in South Africa was coupled with a 
substantive requirement of the primacy of treatment for the poorest of the poor, is 
sufficiently flexible and the doctrine of separation of powers manifestly so ambiguous 
and indeterminate, that courts, even if fully committed to the doctrine of separation of 
powers, can adopt entirely different approaches to cases involving social and 
economic rights. That is evident in the far more intense judicial scrutiny of the 
legislature's calculations in Hartz IV than was the case with the calculations upon 





                                                          
23  I am indebted for these insights to the article by Professor Williams as cited above. 
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When courts police constitutional boundaries in which the executive or legislature 
operates, they must do so not in order to undermine the work of the other arms of 
government but rather because the Constitution is supreme and all policy formulation 
and the execution thereof must be constitutionally compliant. When the doctrine of 
separation of powers  is invoked as  an argument  that  'policy is  not for the judges', 
this doctrine itself has no  unambiguous content  that prevents  the judicial function  
in enforcing social and economic rights.    
 
I accept readily, as is evident from my brief discussion of non compliance with court 
orders, that the area of socio-economic rights and judicial interference into policy 
which is challenged in court is fraught with difficulty. However  my argument  has 
been, firstly  that the doctrine of separation of powers  does not connote a self 
evident meaning which  automatically constrains the operation of courts in their 
contribution to the implementation of the thick model of democracy as promoted by 
our  text. Further, as the Court in the Simelane case illustrated, the doctrine does not 
even prevent a court from interrogating a decision of the President for lack of 
rationality. How much more so, it must follow, may a court probe the reasonableness 
of social and economic rights provisioning, such test being grounded in the lived 
context faced by desperately poor litigants.  
 
In the final analysis, only if all three arms of government work together can the 
ultimate product be the translation of the constitutional dreams set out in the majestic 
text of the 1996 Constitution into a practical reality for 51 million South Africans. 
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